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L e w is  o n  A n im a l Im m o rta lity
Susanne E. Foster
Traditionally, Christians have denied the im m ortal­
ity of the anim al soul. The argum ents for this con­
clusion are varied. First, there is the argum ent from  trad i­
tion. Since the C hurch has never taugh t that anim als sur­
vive their bodily  deaths and  has, on occasion, taught that 
anim als do no t survive their deaths, Christians have good 
reason to believe that anim als have no im m ortal soul. In 
addition to the argument from tradition, there are also two 
philosophical argum ents against accepting anim al im m or­
tality, namely that animals participate in no activities that 
do not involve their bodies, so they could not survive 
w ithout their bodies, and, second, continued existence 
w ould have no m eaning for a being which was m erely 
sentient and so had  no  m em ory of itself over time. It is 
interesting, then, that C.S. Lewis follows George M acDon­
ald and others in speculating that anim als, or at least some 
animals, m ay have a share in im m ortality. Even more 
im portant, how ever, is that the view  that anim als are 
im m ortal — a view  w hich Lewis knew  full well m ust be 
regarded as speculative — pervades his works and is an 
integral p a rt of his theology.
In this paper, I will recount the argum ents against 
anim al im m ortality and Lewis' response to them. Then, I 
will argue that Lewis' com m itm ent to the im m ortality of 
anim als stem s from  three considerations. First, Lewis is 
concerned w ith  the problem  of anim al suffering, and his 
speculations on  anim al im m ortality provide a satisfying 
resolution to that problem . Second, his views on anim al 
im m ortality enhance and bolster his environm ental ethics, 
his m odel of Christian stew ardship. Third, his specula­
tions on the possibility of anim al im m ortality allow him  to 
clarify the natu re  and  m eaning of the im m ortality of h u ­
m an beings.
II
The standard  C hristian argum ent against the im m or­
tality of the anim al soul is the argum ent from  tradition. 
From Biblical tim es onw ard, both scripture and the trad i­
tion have been virtually silent about an afterlife for ani­
mals. In m atters of faith, the silence of tradition is often 
reason enough to reject a thesis. Yet, there is stronger 
evidence on the question of anim al im m ortality, for, on 
occasion, the church fathers and theologians have spoken 
on this issue. W hen they have, they have denied the im­
m ortality of anim als. For example, C ardinal Bellermine, 
one of the few Christian figures to explicitly argue that 
anim als are objects of m oral concern, accepted "the 
C hurch's teaching" that anim als do not have souls.1 Even 
m ore authoritatively, in the Summa Contra Gentiles Thomas 
A quinas writes: "it can be inferred w ith  necessity that the 
soul of the b ru te  perishes w ith  the body .”2 He also quotes
the following text from  On the Teaching of the Church "We 
declare that m an alone has a subsistent soul, that is, a soul 
having life of itself; and that the soul of b ru te  anim als 
perishes along w ith their bodies."3 Again, p roposition  20 
of the C ondem nation of 1277 states that it is anathem a to 
say that na tu ra l law  prohibits the eating of irrational ani­
mals.4 Of course, the condem nation w as carried out by  the 
Bishop of Paris and subsequently  has been questioned, at 
least insofar as it touches upon  the teachings of Aquinas, 
b u t bishops are part of the institutional church and  have 
teaching authority. To say that the trad ition  has no t de­
clared the teaching anathem a, then, is no t to say that the 
teaching is no t rejected by the tradition. Both silence and 
the teachings of various theologians and  the tradition 
support the view  that it is anathem a.
Lewis' response to the argum ent from  tradition  is to 
em phasize the silence of tradition  and  to argue that, in this 
case, the dearth  of explicit condem natory opinion w ithin 
the Christian tradition can be explained by the fact that 
tradition only speaks on issues that are im portan t to the 
salvation of hum an  beings. Since the im m ortality of the 
anim als is no t relevant to hum an  salvation, one w ould 
expect tradition to be relatively silent on the m atter, (pp 
129)5 He also argues that any explicit argum ents against 
anim al im m ortality can be traced to tw o factors. The first 
concerns philosophical difficulties su rrounding  the ques­
tion of anim al immortality: m erely sentient beings cannot 
exist w ithout their bodies, and im m ortality w ould  no t be 
m eaningful to a m erely sentient being. The second factor 
and perhaps the m ore im portan t one is the C hurch 's wish 
to preserve a strong distinction betw een anim als and h u ­
mans, a distinction which is both m oral and  m etaphysi­
cal, (pp 140)
III
Let us turn , then, to the second of these factors and 
examine the reasons that Lewis believed underlay  the 
Church's rejection of the im m ortality of the anim al soul. 
First, as Lewis m entions, attributing souls to anim als 
m ay obscure the distinction betw een hum an  beings and 
other anim als as sharp in the spiritual dim ension as it is 
hazy and problem atic in the biological. H istorically, the 
distinction betw een hum an  beings and  anim als has been 
based on consciousness and rationality, or on the posses­
sion of an im m ortal soul; and the im m ortality of the soul 
has been linked to theoretical reasoning. For this reason, 
the church has had  a stake in m aintaining that anim als are 
incapable of theoretical reasoning and that their souls 
perish w ith their bodies. As Lewis argues in The Problem of 
Pain, Abolition of Man, and  "Vivisection," how ever, con­
tem porary science shows that on purely  na tu ra l grounds,
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there is no  basis for a strong  distinction betw een hum an  
beings and  the o ther h igher anim als. H um an beings 
evolved from  the anim als. All the capacities h um an  beings 
have are possessed by  other anim als in  a t least a rud im en­
tary  form , including  the ability to feel significant pain, the 
ability to solve problem s, and  self-awareness. In this way, 
h um an  beings can be reduced  to the status of anim als. (Viv 
227) As is obvious, this conclusion is unacceptable from  a 
C hristian perspective. The best th ing  to do m ight be to tu rn  
the argum ent on its head: instead, argue tha t such consid­
erations show  th a t the status of anim als should  be ele­
vated. Since the ability to feel p leasure and  pain  is som e­
tim es taken  to be the ground  of m oral obligation, it can be, 
and  has been, argued  that anim als are objects of m oral 
concern. A nd  since self-consciousness and rationality are 
the n a tu ra l basis for t  he value of hum an  beings, sine 
theological considerations, self-conscious anim als are 
equally valuable from  the na tu ra l perspective. Even this 
m ove is problem atic from  Lewis' perspective, how ever, 
since he believes, and  the Church has always taught, that 
how ever h a rd  it m ay  be to specify the reasons for the 
distinction, h u m an  beings are objectively m ore valuable 
than  o ther anim als.(Viv 226, pp  43)
A nd  scrip ture does support a distinction betw een h u ­
m an  beings and  o ther anim als. To sam ple just a sprinkling 
of scrip tural evidence: God tells us that a h um an  being is 
m ore valuable than  a sparrow (M t 10:29-31); it is for the 
salvation of hum ank ind  that G od died  on the cross; and 
h um an  beings have been given special status as stew ards 
over creation. (Gn 1:28-30) Since there is no strong biologi­
cal basis for the distinction betw een hum an  beings and 
other anim als, the only rem aining distinction betw een 
anim als and  hum ans seem s to be the possession of an 
im m ortal soul. Theologians argue that because only h u ­
m an  beings have an im m ortal soul, only they have a good 
that transcends flourishing in  this life. This good serves as 
the basis for the difference in m oral value and in m oral 
consideration.
A lthough it m ay  appear at this po in t that, if the claim 
that h um an  beings are m ore valuable and  m ore deserving 
of m oral consideration is no t m ere prejudice, then it m ust 
rest on the uniqueness and  im m ortality  of the hum an  soul, 
Lewis believes there is a w ay to preserve the distinction 
betw een h u m an  beings and  an im als w ithout denying the 
im m ortality  of the anim al soul.
Rather than  argue against the im m ortality of animals, 
Lewis argues that som e anim als m aybe  conscious and that 
there is good reason to  th ink  tha t there is a linkage betw een 
consciousness and  im m ortality. As I will show  in the next 
section, Lewis believes that the reason God preserves a 
being after it dies is tha t good is achieved by doing so; 
nam ely tha t the goodness of the being will be preserved 
and  that a continued  existence will be of genuine benefit 
to the being in  question. His ow n m odel of the im m ortality 
of the anim al soul accounts for the priority  of hum an  
beings by  recognizing that, anim als are dependen t upon
hum an  beings both  for their perfection in  this life and for 
their continued existence in  the next. U nderstand ing  ani­
m al im m ortality  w ith in  the context of the stew ardship  
relationship thus preserves the d istinction betw een ani­
m als and  hum an  beings while leaving room  for anim al 
im m ortality. The only questions, then, are w hether ani­
m als are the sorts of beings that can atta in  im m ortality  and 
w hat that im m ortality  w ould  be like.
The rem aining objections to anim al im m ortality  focus 
not on the th reat to our unique status as h u m an  beings bu t 
on w hether anim als could have im m ortal souls. The objec­
tions are distinctly philosophical, and  depend  on certain 
theories of the relationship betw een the soul and  body. It 
is argued that anim als are no t the sort of beings tha t could 
survive the death  of bodies and  that even if they could, 
im m ortality  could be of no  genuine benefit to an a n im a l.
Can an anim al survive the death  of its body? T radition­
ally, philosophers have argued  that, if the soul is to survive 
the death  of the body, it m ust engage in  an  activity or 
activities that are possible w ithou t the body, and  such an 
activity or activities m ust have no n a tu ra l term inus. N u ­
trition, reproduction, grow th, sensation, and  m otility all 
require bodily  organs. M oreover such activities have a 
natural term inus. Eating, for exam ple, ends w ith  satiety. 
According to the Platonic and  A ristotelian traditions, both 
of w hich influenced C hristian theology, all activities ex­
cept thinking require bodily  organs for their exercise. 
Hence, only thought could be free from  the need  for a 
body. Some form s of thought, though, have a natu ral 
term inus. Just as there is a na tu ra l term inus to bodily 
activities, so there is a na tu ra l term inus to the thought 
about such m atters. A fter a certain po in t there is no reason 
to continue re fle c tin g  on or d e lib e ra t in g  a b o u t  th em .
Hence, practical reason, w hich in  conjunction w ith  virtues 
like tem perance and  generosity, elevates practical activity 
to hum an  activity is no t sufficient: for im m ortality. For 
both  Plato and  Aristotle, the only activity tha t m eets both 
criteria is theoretical reasoning. M ost anim als, it m ay be 
claimed, engage in no  activities that are independen t of 
their bodies, and even those that m ay be conscious and
possess reason, possess only practical reason. So, animals
either could not exist w ithou t their bodies or, if they could,
they engage in no activities that could be meaningfully
e n g a g e d  in  a f te r  th e  d e a th  o f  th e ir  b o d ie s .
Lewis appeals to the doctrine of the bodily  resurrection 
to resolve the first p a rt of the objection, since the bodies of 
anim als m ay be resurrected  just as h um an  bodies are 
resurrected. He resolves the second p a rt of the objection 
by arguing that there are activities o ther than  theoretical 
reasoning that could ~e m eaningfully  engaged in after 
death. Such an activity, he argues, m ust go beyond the 
experiencing of m ere bodily pleasure.(PP ~37) In m ore 
strictly ethical term s, the anim al m ust be able to flourish. 
But rather than  ty ing flourishing to theoretical reasoning, 
as the ancients and  m edievals do, Lewis ties it to activities 
involving consciousness and  personality . Forem ost
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am ong the activities he has in  m ind  are those involved in 
creating and m aintain ing comm unity.
Any being w ith  sense organs has sentience, the ability 
to sense its environm ent and to react to that environm ent 
w ith pleasure and pain  responses.6 But in a m erely sen­
tient anim al, all that there is a stream  of perceptions and 
responses to them . Unlike a hum an  being, which possesses 
a self standing apart from  the stream  of perceptions and 
persisting through  time, a sentient anim al possesses no 
self, no th ing  w hereby it can unify the stream  of percep­
tions or assess it. (In Kantian terms, there is no transcen­
dental un ity  of apperception for animals.) Thus, a sentient 
anim al cannot recognize itself as the same anim al from 
moment to moment. W ithout consciousness there is no 
basis for m em ory, hence a sentient anim al does no t re­
m em ber w hat happened  a m om ent ago, nor can it look 
forw ard to a fu ture state, (pp 131-3) Such an anim al does 
not experience itself as the same self over time. It can have 
no future goals, and  the only good it can achieve is pleas­
urable sensation. Since sentient anim als have no long term  
goals and no recognition of them selves over time, im m or­
tality could be of no benefit to them  .
W ith the em ergence of even rudim entary  conscious­
ness and m em ory comes the possibility of a good beyond 
m om entary pleasure. The conscious anim al can rem em ber 
past experiences and  look forw ard to future goals. Its 
continued existence is m eaningful to it. A conscious ani­
m al can both  enjoy its existence and desire the attainm ent 
of goals. M ost significantly, an anim al that possesses con­
scious m em ories and  can project itself into the fu ture in at 
least lim ited w ays can learn from  its environm ent and 
make some lim ited choices. It can develop a personality. 
This is especially true of conscious anim als that are in 
contact w ith o ther beings that possess personality, since 
com m unity fosters the developm ent of the self.
V
The fourth  objection to anim al im m ortality is related 
to the last, nam ely that no genuine good could be achieved 
by anim al im m ortality, and so attributing im m ortality to 
animals is m ere sentim entalism . One version of this argu­
m ent is based on the claim that we m ay be attributing a 
soul to anim als because anim als seem  to feel pain, and a 
good God w ould  surely redress the injustice of pain  being 
suffered by any of His creatures. But attributing pain  to 
beasts m ay be anthropom orphic sentimentalism.
Lewis answ ers this objection by appealing to a distinc­
tion betw een sentience and  consciousness. M uch, if: not 
all, anim al life m ay be sentient b u t no t conscious. As we 
have seen, the experience of a sentient creature is a discon­
nected series of sense perceptions. It is likely that, although 
merely sentient anim als respond to painful and pleasur­
able stimuli, they are unable to experience pain  in a full 
sense of the term , since they have no  self-awareness. If they 
do experience pain, they do so only as a series of instanta­
neous disagreeable sensations, and  such pains are not
frightening, and hence of little consequence. Pains of this 
sort, therefore, do not constitute suffering, (pp 131-3) Fur­
ther, as we have seen, even if anim als experienced pain, in 
the full sense indicated, and such pain  w ere significant, 
im m ortality w ould  still be of no benefit to a sentient ani­
mal. Recognition of a self, as a self, by  tha t sam e self w ould  
be missing. Hence, as Lewis says, a new t resurrected  to 
eternal life w ould  not recognize itself as the sam e new t.(pp 
137) Justice certainly does no t dem and, as com pensation 
for earlier, unpleasant perceptions, the continuation of a 
life that consists of nothing m ore than  an unconnected 
series of perceptions. As Lewis puts it, to ascribe an after­
life to m erely sentient beings as com pensation for dam ­
ages incurred is a clum sy assessm ent of the Divine Good­
ness. It is basically to th ink that, som ehow , "G od trod  on 
the anim als' tails in the dark  and  then d id  the best he  could 
about it."(pp 140)
As far as m erely sentient beings are concerned, then, 
either there is no real experience of pain  and thus no 
injustice that needs to be redressed or if there is genuine 
suffering, the continuation of life could be of no  real benefit 
to a sentient animal. The inevitable conclusion is that the 
Church is right to condem n the view  that m erely sentient 
creatures, those m oved only by sense and appetite, could 
be immortal. All that having been acknow ledged, Lewis is 
unw illing to deny im m ortality to ail beasts. Some, he 
thinks, and particularly the h igher anim als, m ay be con­
scious, or m ay be able to becom e conscious and achieve 
personality. A conscious animal, in  the sense in question 
here, can feel significant pain  and can suffer. Thus, there 
is a genuine injustice to be redressed in  their case. Further, 
continued existence w ould  be of benefit to an anim al 
aware of itself over time.
V I
A final argum ent against anim al im m ortality is based 
on the notion of intrinsic value and  inherent goodness. 
A lthough we m ay become attached to anim als just as we 
m ay become attached to other objects, a favorite sweater 
or a Teddy bear, animals, like other objects, are no t unique, 
except in their relationship to the person  w ho happens to 
value them. One new t is very m uch the sam e as any other 
newt. But, in fact, one of the principal purpose of im m or­
tality is to preserve beings of unique value or goodness. 
Hence, it m akes no sense to preserve the beasts.
Again, Lewis believes that this objection can be an­
sw ered if we invoke a distinction betw een consciousness 
and sentience. Consciousness is the basis of personality 
and thereby of uniqueness. W ithout it, one new t is, indeed, 
very m uch the same as another. Though the species m ay 
be unique, w ithout consciousness the individual anim al is 
not. Those anim als that possess or can achieve conscious­
ness m ay survive their bodily deaths, while the m erely 
sentient cannot. Even m ore strongly, if species are unique, 
Lewis suggests, then God m ay resurrect the species rather 
than  individual animals. The species "Lion" rather than  
lions m ay achieve imm ortality.
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For Lewis, then, any viable theory of anim al im m or­
tality will have to account for tw o facts. First, if an anim al 
is going to be resurrected, there m ust be som ething of 
value that w ill be preserved  by  the resurrection, and the 
view s on biblical stew ardship  and  the redem ption  of na­
ture, and  bo th  influenced his speculations on anim al im ­
m ortality, Exam ining them , therefore, w ill help m ake Le­
w is' view s on anim al im m ortality clearer.
In the h igher anim als, w e find a capacity for pain  and 
pleasure, a well developed brain  capable of reasoning, 
rud im entary  em otions —  in short, all the prerequisites for 
consciousness and  self-awareness. A nd just as there are 
now  anim als tha t possess these characteristics and  are not 
yet conscious, so too there m ay have been a long period  in 
w hich hum an-like creatures existed b u t had  n o t yet be­
come conscious. W hen these prim itive homo sapiens at­
tained consciousness, they becam e hum an  and attained a 
degree of value and  goodness beyond that of every other 
anim al, because w ith  consciousness comes will, or the 
ability to choose.(M ir ch.15-6, Per 102) But, the will of 
these beings w as no t yet at odds w ith  itself. Thus, in the 
pre-lapsarian  state, the consciousness of hum an  beings 
involved a m astery  over them selves, their appetites, their 
need  for sleep, and  even the length of their lives. As a 
na tu ra l extension of such self-control, the beasts came 
under the dom inance of hum an  beings, for in  hum an  
beings, beasts apprehend  as m uch of the divine splendor 
as their natures allow, (pp 78) That is, th rough  hum an 
beings o ther anim als w ere able to achieve at least rud i­
m entary  personality  and  consciousness .
A lthough Lewis discusses stew ardship  and  the correct 
relationship betw een h um an  beings and other animals 
elsewhere, his m ost extended discussion of the ideal stew ­
ardship  experienced in  the pre-lapsarian state occurs in 
Perelandra. Perelandra is a w orld  very sim ilar to pre-lap­
sarian Earth. Like prim itive homo sapiens, the king and 
queen of that w orld  are in direct com m union w ith  God 
and  His will. As a result, they have control over their ow n 
desires and  needs and  have total authority  over their 
w orld. W hat is the relationship betw een this sovereign 
lord  and  lady  and  their beasts? The queen says that, "I 
teach the beasts they will never be better than  I."(Per 83) 
There is, and  she believes there is, an objective hierarchy 
of being. It is n o t p roper to treat the low er as superior or 
equal to the higher, according to her. for to do so is idola­
try. O n the o ther hand , it is no t p roper to treat beasts as 
though  they  possessed no intrinsic value or goodness. The 
villain of the book. W eston, objectifies anim als and uses 
them  for his ow n purposes w ithout regard for their value. 
His destruction of anim als for trivial reasons, like decora­
tion, or for som e perverse pleasure, like the joy of inflicting 
pain, are the ultim ate expression of evil in  this w orld.(Per 
108-9,134-5) The queen of Perelandra, on the other hand, 
recognizes the goodness and value of animals. Rather than 
reducing them  to autom ata, "by taking seriously the infe­
riority of her [animal] adm irers [she] m ade them  som ehow 
less inferior — raised them  From  the status of pets to that
of slaves."(Per. 65) W hat does Lewis m ean  here? A  slave, 
though low er in  status than  a m aster because of his o r her 
inability to govern his- or her self is nonetheless conscious, 
possessed of a personality, the em bodim ent of a good 
beyond the experience of pleasure, and  deserving of m ore 
respect and  care than  should  be extend to a. m ere beast. 
By expecting her beasts to act well, the queen  helps them  
to attain  personality. Though she cannot m ake h e r anim als 
fully hum an  any m ore than  Christ can m ake h um an  beings 
fully divine, she can raise them  to a new  level of conscious­
ness and  m ake, "the nobler of the beasts so w ise tha t they 
will becom e hnau and  speak."(Per 211)
Even w hen  they attain  consciousness, this conscious­
ness will no t be, and  cannot be, equal to the queen's. 
Hence, in  re tu rn  for their care, such anim als should  and 
do serve the king and queen. (Per 203) It is possible, Lewis 
speculates, that one of the original reasons G od gave h u ­
m an beings sovereignty w as that they  ennoble the beasts. 
Stew ardship m ay have that, as w ell as o ther reasons, be­
h ind  it.
Such speculations are interesting, b u t h u m an  beings 
are, in fact, fallen, and  it is pertinen t to ask w hat our 
relationship to beasts should  be in our curren t state. Lewis 
argues that if, in fact, hum an  beings w ere created to be 
m asters of the Earth, it is tam e anim als, those subject to the 
rule of hum an  beings, and  no t w ild  anim als w hich are in 
their na tu ra l state. A nd, it is, partly  for that reason, that 
tam e anim als that serve as the m odel for our under­
standing of stew ardship  and  of anim al im m ortality. Like 
the queen of Perelandra, hum an  beings are to recognize 
the goodness of creation w ithou t elevating it to the status 
of an idol or failing to recognize the difference betw een 
anim als and ourselves. The appropriate  relationship be­
tw een hum an  beings and  anim als is tha t of a good m aster 
and his dog. In such a relationship, the p rim ary  aim  is the 
good of the m aster. The dog is taken care of in  o rder that 
the m aster m ay love it and  in o rder tha t it m ay  serve the 
m aster. N onetheless, the dog is n o t to be sacrificed to the 
m aster. Rather, if the m aster is to love the dog, it m ust also 
love th e  m a s te r , a n d  if th e  d o g  is to  se rv e  th e  m a s te r , th e
m aster m ust also serve it. Because the master loves the 
dog, he interferes w ith  it and  its behavior to m ake it m ore 
lovable. He elim inates its foul odor, house trains it, and 
teaches it no t to steal. Indeed, the tam e dog is far better off 
than  the w ild  dog, for it lives longer, is healthier, and 
receives • m ore comforts than  it w ould  in  the w ild .(pp ' 
-39-40) Its better condition is, of course direct resu lt of its 
m aster's love and  expectations. M ore than  this, the tam e 
dog achieves a level of personal developm ent it w ould  not 
in  the wild. We do no t and, indeed, cannot love the beasts 
as sub-personal; w e alw ays love them  as if they have, in 
fact, (3 personality. A nd  in  loving an anim al as though it 
w ere personal, w e enable it to develop tow ard  conscious­
ness. (FI 49) Thus, even in our post-lapsarian  state, hum an  
beings have the ability to raise anim als to the level of 
consciousness and to develop personality  in  them .(PP 43) 
Even now , our dogs and  cats can thus be tain ted  w ith  the
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love of our households. (SI 104) If animals do not receive 
the whole of their personality from  hum ans, hum an be­
ings are at least largely responsible for the developm ent of 
rudim entary personality present in the beasts. And, as the 
animal receives its personality from  man, so too it receives 
its immortality.
How is the m odel of stew ardship translated into a 
m odel of anim al immortality? Lewis discusses this in Mere 
Christianity, Miracles, Great Divorce and Problem of Pain. 
God, Lewis tells us, "descends into hum an spirit and 
hum an spirit so descends into nature...everything hangs 
together and the total reality, both natural and supernatu­
ral, in which we are living is m ore multifarious and subtly 
harm onious than we had  expected."(Mir. I l l )  If, indeed, 
animals fell w hen the angels fell (Lewis accepts archae­
ological evidence of the carnivorous nature of animals 
before the advent of hum an  beings, and concludes that the 
fall of anim al nature m ust have preceded that of hum an 
beings), anim al nature m ay have fallen back into vegeta­
tive nature in the same w ay that hum an nature fell back 
into anim al nature. Just as hum an nature is resurrected in 
Christ, so animal nature m ay be resurrected in hum an 
beings. Christ redeem ed hum an nature in this world, and 
it is in Christ that hum an beings are resurrected to eternal 
life. Similarly, in this life, hum an beings are able to raise 
animals from their sub-conscious state and help them  to 
achieve a good beyond pleasure, and in the next life ani­
mals call be resurrected to eternal life through their m as­
ters. Thus, even in heaven it will make no sense to speak 
of animals as existing on their own.(pp 139-40, MC 170) In 
The Great Divorce we see the great of heaven attended by 
the animals they have ennobled, and sharing with them 
their personality. "Every beast and bird  that came near her 
had its place in her love. In her they became themselves. 
And now the abundance of life she has in Christ from the 
Father flows over into them."(GDiv 108).
A dog thus does not exist independently in the after­
life. It exists as part of a household. And, if one were to ask 
where the soul of the dog resides, the answer is that it is 
where it has always been, in the m aster of the house.(pp 
140, MC 170) The fact that it is not m erely life bu t individu­
ated life which becomes immortal, makes this claim of 
Lewis' an especially pointed and revealing one.
Animal im m ortality is, then, a natural extension of the 
biblical conception of stew ardship as Lewis interprets it. 
Furthermore, there is scriptural evidence for such an ex­
tension. Concerning to w orld to come. Paul writes:
Indeed  the w h o le  created w orld  eagerly  aw aits the revelation  
o f the son s o f G od. C reation w a s m ad e subject to futility , not 
o f its o w n  accord b ut by  h im  w h o  once subjected it; yet not 
w ith ou t h op e, becau se  the w orld  itse lf w ill be freed from  the 
slavery to corruption  and share in the g lorious freedom  of 
the son s o f G od.(R m  8:19-21)
This passage could be taken to imply both that creation 
and hence animals will participate in the life to come and 
that their participation will be m ediated by hum an beings.
In another context, Isaiah ii speaks of the reign of Christ, 
in which even the beasts are reconciled to one another. 
Perhaps the passage is m etaphor, b u t perhaps the m eta­
phor itself represents a profound reality. The Kingdom  of 
God m ay be such that in it all creatures, even the beasts, 
dwell in peace before God.(PP 143, GDiv. 108)
VIII
Although animal imm ortality is both  in keeping w ith 
Lewis' m odel of stew ardship and w ith scripture, there are 
several significant problem s w ith the theory Lewis argues 
for. They are problem s Lewis himself recognizes. The first 
is the lim ited application of the theory. M ost anim als are 
wild and m any others are in laboratories or bad  homes. 
None of these animals is in relationship to a good master; 
hence, none can attain imm ortality as part of a household. 
Nor does Lewis make house pets of w ild animals. As we 
learn in That Hideous Strength, anim als retain their na­
tures. Immortality, Lewis stressed, is the fruit of conscious­
ness and personality. It is probable that in laboratories and 
in the w ild few animals achieve consciousness. That wild 
animals somehow become a self, and consequently gain 
an immortality, is a realistic possibility only in relation to 
hum anity at large, (pp 14i) He also says that resurrection 
in a good household is bu t one example of the general 
principles which could be used for anim al immortality. 
Lewis does not m ean it to be the sole possibility. (PA 167) 
But w hat of the dog which Mrs. Fidget spoiled and which 
is bad through no fault of its own?(FL 74-5) Is such an 
animal sent to hell because of its bad household? That 
w ould seem far too harsh a fate since it was not responsible 
for its state.
Or does it cease to exist as do those anim als which fail 
to achieve personality? This problem  points to the second 
strong disanalogy betw een Christ's relationship to hum an 
beings and the relationship hum an beings m ay have to 
animals. In our post-lapsarian state, we are not in harm ony 
with and do not understand the good of the animals nor 
God's purpose in creating them , even in a good household. 
Moreover, hum an beings did not create anim als bu t are 
instead co-creatures w ith them. H um an beings, then, u n ­
able to save themselves, are poor saviors for the rest of 
creation. W hy w ould God provide such a poor m eans of 
salvation for the animals?
But there is an answer. Quite simply, it is that our 
relationships and our actions have genuine consequences 
for the salvation of ourselves and others. This is true of all 
hum an beings. Consider the reluctance of the early Church 
to allow believers to divorce unbelieving spouses. The 
hope expressed was that the unbeliever m ight come to 
believe through the believing spouse.(I Cor.7:12-16) It is 
now less popular to em phasize the role others p lay in the 
salvation of an individual, bu t it is a Biblical them e Lewis 
not only knows bu t believes in. His conception of salvation 
is, like so m any others, essentially com m unitarian. In That 
Hideous Strength, the wife of Mark, one of the m ain char­
acters, plays a significant role in his salvation, and God
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uses the Dennistons, the Dimbles, the Director, and others 
to save Jane, another central figure. Christians do not live 
in isolation b u t in com m unities and the actions of each 
individual have genuine consequences for the w orld and 
for others as w ell as for themselves. In the same book, 
M erlin reveals that M ark and Jane's decision no t to have 
children is responsible for the w orld 's losing a child that 
w ould  have been a great leader. God leaves it to us to do 
the things He has en trusted  us to do.
The hum an  role in  animal, im m ortality thus stems from 
these tw o sources. To m erit resurrection, an anim al m ust 
first achieve consciousness but, even w hen consciousness, 
it is no t able to com prehend nearly  as m uch of the divine 
as hum ans. Christ cannot, then, "go to" the animals. It is 
no t that he cannot m ake him self small enough. Christ can 
m ake him self small enough to fit into hell itself. (GDiv 
123-4) Rather, it is because a m essage of im m ortality makes 
no sense to the sub-conscious. It is th rough the presence of 
conscious beings that anim als begin to grow  tow ard con­
sciousness and personality. To help them  do it well is our 
task. For each person  is given tasks to perform , tasks they 
are responsible for, and each m em ber of a com m unity has 
a genuine effect on all the others. W hat we do or fail to do 
affects how  others grow. Obviously, others are free to 
respond in  a positive or negative m anner, and obviously 
God can w ork for the salvation of each through w hatever 
circum stances arise. Nonetheless, we do influence how  the 
story of salvation unfolds. There is a real sense in which 
G od has chosen to rely on us for the redem ption of nature.
VI
Lewis' second suggestion about anim al imm ortality, 
one w hich he develops in m uch less detail, reflects his 
Platonic leanings and his belief that although individual 
anim als are not unique if they are not conscious, species 
are unique and therefore valuable. According to Lewis, the 
m erely sentient anim al m ay gain im m ortality as a corpo­
rate self. Rather than this lion being im m ortal, "Lioness" 
itself w ould  be preserved, indeed immortal.
In w hat sense is a species unique? They are aestheti­
cally valuable, certainly, b u t their value goes beyond 
physical beauty. They also possess a quasi-spiritual, sym ­
bolic, and em otional value that hum an  beings recognize in 
them. To the lam b we attribute innocence, to the lion 
royalty. W hen we attribute personality to anim al types, 
there is a na tu ra l basis for doing so, for we are seeing 
som ething real.(PP 141)
Of course, as Lewis points out, some change m ust occur 
in sentient species before they can be resurrected even in 
the form  of a corporate self. The lion as we experience it is 
m ere "carnivorous sentience" and the survival of such a 
being not only w ould  be w ithout m eaning, bu t w ould be, 
if anything, a to rm ent to the lion. A carnivore cannot eat 
hay like an ox. The solution to this difficulty is, Lewis 
believes, that the carnivorous aspect of anim al nature is 
the result of the fall. Currently, we do not see animals
them selves b u t rather anim als in their fallen state. Animals 
m ust be resurrected into their unfallen nature. Claw and 
tooth are a clum sy post-lapsarian rendering  of the awe-in­
spiring nature  of LION. The raised lion w ould  lose these 
while retaining and indeed regaining its true nature. A 
resurrected lion will no t be like a large dom estic cat, but 
w hen it no longer possesses tooth and  claw, the lion will 
nonetheless rem ain awesome. In The Great Divorce, Lewis' 
reflections are in terrup ted  by the play of tw o lions. 
Though they obviously m ean him  no  harm , he finds their 
com pany disquieting and moves away.(GDiv 37) Thus, 
Lewis argues, the lion will never, in fact, lie dow n w ith the 
lamb. To have lions cavort w ith lambs is to have neither 
lions nor lambs.
The resurrection of all the individuals of a species 
w ithin the form  of the species serves to preserve the 
uniqueness of the species w ithout resurrecting merely 
sentient anim als for w hom  im m ortality could have no 
meaning. Yet, even the forms of anim als as they now 
appear are not fit objects for im m ortality. To preserve 
animals, distortions due to the fall D istorted features in­
clude the carnivorous nature of m ust first be rem edied, 
some anim als and the fecundity of others. There is a par­
allel here; just as an individual anim al w ould  be perfected 
by the developm ent of consciousness and personality, so 
too a species form  is perfected through its resurrection to 
a pre-lapsarian state.7
VII:
As we have seen, one of the m ain objections to animal 
im m ortality is that there is a genuine difference between 
hum an beings and other animals. The im m ortality of the 
hum an soul has often been supposed to be the essence of 
that distinction. Lewis accepts the distinction between 
hum ans and other animals, bu t argues that a genuine and 
im portant difference betw een hum ans and anim als can be 
preserved if we recognize that anim als are dependent 
upon hum an beings for their perfection in this life and for 
their continued existence in the next.
By distinguishing consciousness from  sentience, Lewis 
is able to argue that it m akes sense for some anim als to be 
resurrected. Though im m ortality w ould  be of no benefit 
to the m erely sentient, a conscious anim al has a good that 
goes beyond physical pleasure and an aw areness of itself 
over time. Hence such an anim al could benefit from a 
continued existence. In the case of a conscious animal, its 
continued existence also serves to preserve som ething of 
intrinsic value.
In the case of the m erely sentient anim al, this latter 
good can be achieved through the preservation and per­
fection of the species form. Further, the preservation of the 
species form  rather than the individual anim al avoids the 
absurdities that result from  the con-tiinence of m erely 
sentient animals.
Im m ortality, then, is m eaningful if it is a genuine good 
for the being preserved and if it preserves som ething of
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intrinsic value. M oreover, hum ans are obligate, because 
they are the kind of beings they are in  G od's created world, 
to be stew ards over creation. This stew ardship involves 
m ore than  conserving resources for future generations or 
m inim izing the suffering of animals. For hum an  beings are 
obligated to help anim als attain the highest perfection of 
which they are capable, nam ely consciousness and person­
ality. The fruit of this perfection is immortality. 
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and ability to send and receive faxes. Please contact the Editor 
to discuss the further details (details at end of page 7).
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